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Of Constituents and Contributors
Richard Briffault*
Introduction
In the stirring conclusion to his plurality opinion in McCutcheon v. FEC,1 Chief Justice
Roberts pointed to the close connection between campaign contributions and what he called the
“political responsiveness at the heart of the democratic process.”2 Quoting Edmund Burke’s
statement in his famous Speech to the Electors of Bristol that a representative’s judgment should
be informed by “the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his
constituents,”3 the Chief Justice eloquently declaimed that “[c]onstituents have the right to
support candidates who share their views and concerns. Representatives are not to follow
constituent orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns. Such
responsiveness is key to the concept of self-governance.”4
The Chief Justice’s emphasis on protecting the representative-constituent relationship
was more than a bit jarring, however, as McCutcheon addressed the desire of an individual to
contribute to candidates in states and congressional districts in which he was not a constituent.
At issue in McCutcheon were the aggregate contribution limits the Federal Election Campaign
Act (“FECA”) imposes on individual campaign contributions. FECA caps not only the amount of
money an individual could donate to a specific candidate in an election – the so-called “base
limit” – but the aggregate amount an individual may donate to all federal candidates, political
parties and political committees that donate to federal candidates in an election cycle, as well as,
within the overall cap, the aggregate amount the individual may donate to all federal candidates
in that cycle.5 A direct consequence of the aggregate cap is to limit the number of candidates a
*

Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia University School of Law.
134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014).
2
Id. at 1461.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 1464.
5
At the time of the McCutcheon litigation, FECA imposed four distinct aggregate limits – a limit on the total an
individual could give to all federal candidates ($48,000 in the 2013-14 election cycle); a limit on the total an
individual could give to non-candidate federal political committees ($74,600); a sublimit within the political
committee limit on the total amount that could be donated to state or local party committees and political action
committees (PACs) of $48,600 in 2013-14), and a total limit on all donations to federal candidates and non1
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donor may support and, thus, the number of different election campaigns in which the donor may
participate financially.
In 2012, Shaun McCutcheon, a resident of Alabama, wanted to contribute $1776 apiece
to candidates for the United States Senate in Connecticut and Minnesota, and to candidates for
the House of Representatives running in districts in Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Florida (two
different districts), Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.6 McCutcheon had already made
substantial contributions – one at $5000, two at $2500, and the rest of $1776 – to fifteen other
candidates around the country -- including Senate candidates in Ohio and Georgia, and
candidates in different House districts in California (three), Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Texas (three), and Virginia, as well as to candidates in two different congressional
districts in his home state of Alabama.7 As a result FECA’s aggregate contribution cap barred
those additional contributions.
By invalidating the aggregate contribution limits, the McCutcheon decision permits
Shaun McCutcheon and other individuals with comparable wealth and political commitments to
give to as many candidates in as many constituencies not their own as they want. Indeed, the
very essence of the McCutcheon decision is the facilitation of out-of-district and out-of-state
donations. A donor would not have reached the aggregate cap on candidate donations without
contributing to candidates outside the donor’s own constituency, so that by limiting the number
of candidates to whom a donor could give, the law curbed out-of-district and out-of-state
donations. By preserving the base limits while striking down the aggregate limits, McCutcheon
enables an individual to give much more money but not any more money to any one candidate.
The donor who wants to take advantage of McCutcheon can only give to more candidates (and
political committees and parties that give to candidates).8 Unless the donor wants to give money
candidate committees, which was $123,200 in 2013-24. Id. at 1442-43. The base limits on individual donations in
the 2013-14 election cycle were $2600 per candidate ($5200 for an election cycle consisting of both a primary and
a general election; $32,400 per year to a national party committee; $10,000 per year to a state or local party
committee; and $5000 to a PAC. Id. at 1442.
6
See Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, U.S.
Dist. Ct for the District of Columbia, Case 1:12-cv-01034-JEB, filed June 22, 2012, at 11-12.
7
Id. at 10-11.
8
Chief Justice Roberts was well-aware of this. See 134 S.Ct. supra at 1448 (“the aggregate limits prohibit an
individual from fully contributing to the primary and general elections campaigns of ten or more candidates”).
Similarly, during the McCutcheon oral argument the Chief Justice repeatedly pressed Solicitor General Donald B.
Verrilli, Jr., who was defending the aggregate contribution limits, on the constitutional problem posed by “limiting

2
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to many more candidates campaigning against each other in the same electoral contest -- which
seems unlikely -- the donor will give to more candidates in more different states and districts. By
striking down the aggregate limits, McCutcheon directly promotes contributions by nonconstituents.
The Chief Justice is surely right that campaign contributions are one way an individual
can seek to make officeholders “responsive” to their concerns. But as Shaun McCutcheon’s
donations and intended donations to candidates seeking to represent more than two dozen
different constituencies demonstrate, constituents and contributors are not the same people.
Making elected representatives more responsive to his concerns will not make them more
responsive to their constituents. To the contrary, contributors, particularly non-constituent
contributors, may have very different interests than non-contributor constituents. Increased
responsiveness to contributors may very well be in tension with responsiveness to constituents.
This article explores some aspects of the distinction between constituents and
contributions and the implications of the constituent-contributor relationship for campaign
finance law and democratic self-government. Part I provides a brief overview of the role of nonconstituent donors in financing contemporary election campaigns. It finds that non-constituents
provide the bulk of itemized individual contributions – that is, donations of $200 or more – to
candidates for the House of Representatives and the United States Senate. The data concerning
non-constituent donations in state and local elections is more anecdotal than systematic but there
is considerable evidence that non-constituent, particularly out-of-state, money is plays a large
part in financing state and local elections, too. At all levels of government, there is a significant
disconnect between the categories of contributor and constituent.
Part II considers the implications of substantial non-constituent contributions for the
American system of territorially-based representation and democratic self-government. Given the
potential for officeholder responsiveness to donors celebrated by the Chief Justice, contributors,
in effect, have become another constituency that elected representatives represent. There may be
some value to this, particularly in situations like races for Congress, where the results of
how many candidates an individual can support within the limits that Congress has said don’t present any danger
of corruption.” Transcript of Oral Argument, McCutcheon v. FEC, Oct. 8, 2013, at p. 29. See also id. at p. 28 (asking
about to prevent the appearance of corruption “while at the same time allowing an individual to contribute to
however many House candidates he wants to contribute to?”).
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elections in some states or districts can affect the partisan control of the House or Senate and,
thus, have nationwide implications. Even here, though, non-constituent financing can have an
impact on how representatives represent their actual constituents. The tension between
constituent and contribution representation is even greater when campaigns are funded by donor
from outside the relevant jurisdiction. They belong to a different political community and are not
directly regulated by the laws enacted and enforced by the voters or representative of that
community. To be sure, with the growing nationalization and partisanship of elections, outsiders
may have a strong subjective interest in a state or local race in a distant jurisdiction even if,
objectively, they are not governed by the results.9

The emergence of a substantial non-

constituent constituency poses a significant challenge to our system of representation which is
based almost entirely on the use of territorial constituencies – states, cities, and legislative
districts – for the election of representatives and the processes of democratic self-government.
With outsider contributions posing a challenge to the focus of elected representatives on
the concerns on their voting constituency, a handful of jurisdictions – all of them relatively small
states -- have sought to reduce the role of outside money in state and local elections. Part III
reviews these campaign finance measures and the court decisions that have considered
challenges to them. The case law dealing with state measures that would the limit the
contributions a candidate for state office may accept from outsiders have been generally, albeit
not uniformly, struck down. Such restrictions on outside contributions are almost certainly
unconstitutional, but, as I will suggest, state and local public financing systems that make
candidate eligibility for public funds contingent on raising a threshold number of small donations
from constituents is a constitutional means of ameliorating the impact of outside money by
reducing its importance.
Part IV concludes by considering what the Chief Justice’s invocation of constituency and
the concept of self-government says about the state of contemporary campaign finance doctrine.
The Roberts Court has consistently emphasizes the speech and associational dimensions of

9

See, e.g., James A. Gardner, “The Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, Political Parties, and the National
Colonization of State Politics. 29 J. L. & Pol. 1, 43 (2013); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv. L.
Rev. 1077, 1136 (2014); Todd E. Pettys, Campaign Finance, Federalism, and the Case of the Long-Armed Donor, 81
U. Chi. L. Rev. Dialogue 77, 87-88 (2014).
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campaign finance,10 likening efforts to limit campaign money to government censorship,11 and
rejecting the argument that regulation may be used to prevent big money from distorting the
electoral process.12 In the Court’s view, contributions and spending, even if unequal, play a
valuable role in communicating views about electoral issues and expressing support for
candidates.13 Only campaign contributions that pose the danger of quid pro quo corruption or its
appearance may be limited. The McCutcheon result, which maintains the base limits on
donations to candidates, is easily defended on such free speech grounds, as much of the plurality
opinion demonstrates.14 What is striking about the Chief Justice’s peroration is that it goes
beyond the free speech argument – the right of Shaun McCutcheon to use money to express his
views to a range of candidates -- and makes the case for contributions in terms of promoting the
responsiveness of elected officials to donors. That is more commonly a position taken by critics
of the role of large campaign contributions in our system – who see contributions as distorting
the relationship between representatives and the public -- not supporters. In campaign finance
debates the rhetoric of self-government is more commonly invoked by reformers worried about
the impact of private wealth on democracy than by defenders of the current system. Indeed, as I
will suggest, not only does the Chief Justice’s contention that striking down the aggregation
donation limits will promote accountability to a representative’s constituency fail to persuade,
but it actually underscores exactly what many people find troubling about the current campaign
finance system. Large donations make representatives less responsive to their actual constituents
and more attentive to their donors, thereby undermining the very responsiveness to the people
which the Chief Justice rightly celebrates as “key to the concept of self-governance.” The Chief
Justice’s rhetoric tries to add democratic self-government to free speech in making the case
against campaign finance regulation, but an examination of the constituency-contribution
relationship to which his statement calls attention actually demonstrates the tension between the
Court’s program of campaign finance deregulation and democratic self-government.
I. Contributors, Not Constituents

10

See, e.g., FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 481 (2007) (“[t]hese cases are about political speech”)
(plurality opinion).
11
See id. at 482
12
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 904-05 (2010).
13
McCutcheon, supra, 134 S.Ct. at 1448.
14
134 S.Ct. at 1448-62.
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In Congressional elections, most contributors are not constituents. The Center for
Responsive Politics reports that in the 2013-14 election cycle, candidates for the House of
Representatives received on average 61.4% of their itemized individual contributions from
donors outside their districts, that is, from non-constituents.15 The winners of Congressional
races were even more dependent on out-of-district funding, obtaining on average 64.3% of their
itemized individual campaign contributions from non-constituent donors.16 A total of 53 elected
Representatives (or 12%) of the House received 90% or more of their campaign contributions
from outside their districts; an additional 61 Representatives (14% of the House) received 8089% of their itemized individual contributions from outside their districts.17 With an additional
39 Representatives obtaining 75-79% of their itemized individual contributions from outsiders,18
more than 35% of the members of the House of Representatives received 75% or more of their
campaign funds from non-constituents.
The 2014 elections were not an outlier in terms of the heavy dependence of members of
the House on non-constituent donations. Since the late 1970s, out-of-district donations have
consistently accounted for at least half the itemized individual donations to House candidates,
and since the late 1990s that number has regularly been in the three-fifths to two-thirds range. 19
In 2004, 67% of the value of itemized individual contributions to candidates for the House of
Representatives came from outside the candidate’s district. That year, in 18% of Congressional
districts, one or more candidates received 90% or more of their itemized donations from nonconstituents. Fewer than twenty percent of the House candidates that year raised even a majority

15

See Center for Responsive Politics, “2014 Overview: In-District vs Out-of-District,”
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/district.php?cycle=2014&display=B. The finding that only 61.4% of
donations came from constituents applied only to candidates who received a minimum of $50,000 in itemized
contributions, that is contributions greater than or equal to $200. Federal law requires the reporting of the
information that makes it possible to determine the residence of the donor only for donations of $200 or more.
For all House candidates including those who obtained less than$50,000 in itemized donations the out-of-district
share dropped modestly to 58.2%. See
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/district.php?cycle=2014&display=A.
16
See Center for Responsive Politics, “2014 Overview: In-District vs Out-of-District: All Current Representatives,”
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/district.php?cycle=2014&display=M.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
See James G. Gimpel, Frances E. Lee, and Shannon Pearson-Merkowitz, The Check Is in the Mail: Interdistrict
Funding Flows in Congressional Elections, 52 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 373, 374, 377-78 (2008).
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of their itemized individual donations from within their districts.20 Moreover, most of the nonconstituent money came not from an adjacent district but from far away.21
Last year’s Senate candidates were also heavily dependent on out-of-state funds.
Nineteen of the twenty-eight incumbent Senators who sought reelection in 2014 drew more than
50% of their itemized donations from out-of-staters, including Republican leader Mitch
McConnell who collected 78.5% of his itemized individual funds from outside his home state of
Kentucky.22 Senator McConnell’s unsuccessful Democratic opponent Alison Lundergran Grimes
was not far behind in her dependence on out-of-state funds – 72% of her itemized individual
contributions came from outside Kentucky.23 Both McConnell and Grimes collected significantly
more money donors living in metropolitan New York than from residents of metropolitan
Louisville. Successful Senate challengers or open-seat candidates like Tom Cotton (R-Ark.),
Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), Steven Daines (R-MT),24 and Joni Ernst (R-Iowa)25 obtained
most of their funds from out-of-state. The top zip code for itemized individual donations to
successful Alaska Republican challenger Dan Sullivan was in Palm Beach, Florida, and he
received more itemized individual contributions from the New York metropolitan area than from

20

Id. at 377-78.
Id.
22
See Center for Responsive Politics, “2014 Overview: Candidates: Top In-State vs Top Out-of-State,”
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/instvsout.php. In addition to the ten incumbents listed in the “top in-state
vs top out-of-state” chart incumbent senators running for reelection who received more than half their itemized
individual contributions from out-of-state included Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.) (69% from out of state),
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=DES2&spec=N, James Risch (R-Idaho) (78% from outof-state), http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=IDS1&spec=N, Pat Roberts (R-Kansas) (58%
from out-of-state), http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=KSS1&spec=N; Susan Collins (RMe) (68%) http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=MES2&spec=N; Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH)
(80% from out of state) http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=NHS2&spec=N.; Tom Udalll
(D- NM) (53% from out-of-state) http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=NMS2&spec=N;
Jack Reed, (D-RI) (59% from out-of-state),
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=RIS2&spec=N; Tim Scott (R-SC) (67% from out-ofstate), http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=SCS1&spec=N; Mike Enzi (R-Wyo) (72% from
out-of-state), http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=WYS2&spec=N.
23
See Center for Responsive Politics, “Kentucky Senate Race,”
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=KYS1&spec=N. See also Scott Bland, “leading Senate
Recruits Reliant on Out-of-State Money,” National Journal, 2/21/2014, http://www.nationaljournal.com/hotlineon-call/leading-senate-recruits-reliant-on-out-of-state-money-20140220;
24
See 2014 Overview: Candidates, supra, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/instvsout.php.
25
Center for Responsive Politics, “Iowa Senate Race,”
https://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=IAS2&spec=N.
21
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metropolitan Anchorage.26 Altogether, 22 of the 36 Senate winners last year received more than
half their individual itemized donations from out-of-state.27 Six of the winners28 collected 75% or
more of these funds from out-of-state.
These numbers address only the contributions made by individuals directly to candidates
and do not reflect either the sources of political party committee and PAC contributions to
candidates or the home states or districts of donors to Super PACs and 501(c) committees that
spent independently in support of or opposition to federal candidates. The evidence here is more
anecdotal than comprehensive but one study of donations to Super PACs is revealing. That
study, conducted last fall while the 2014 campaigns were underway, focused on the 34 federal
Super PACs with a state or regional reference in their name, such as the “Put Alaska First PAC,”
“Kentuckians for Strong Leadership,” the “Virginia Progress PAC,” and “New Hampshire
Priorities.” Half of these groups received more than half their itemized contributions from out-ofstate donors, and nearly all the money for some of these PACs came from outside the state the
PAC claimed to represent. Thus, 98% of the money for “Put Alaska First PAC,” 99% of
donations to the “Alaska Salmon PAC,” 95% of the money for “Kentuckians for Strong
Leadership,” 67% of the contributions to “Mississippi Conservatives,” 58% of donations to the
“Virginia Progress PAC,” and 100% of the donations to “New Hampshire Priorities” came from
outside the state whose name was in the PAC’s name. 29 Indeed, many of these state-focused
PACs were not even registered in their putative home states: “Empower Nebraska” was based in
Tampa, Florida, while the “American Heartland PAC,” which spent exclusively on the Iowa
Senate race, was based in Washington, D.C.30
Of course, it could reasonably be argued that there is a broad national stake in the
outcome of specific state and district Congressional elections. As the Supreme Court put it in
26

Center for Responsive Politics, “Sen. Dan Sullivan,”
https://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/geog.php?cycle=2014&cid=N00035774&newMem=Y&type=I.
27
There were 36 races because of special elections to fill the remaining portions of terms of senators who had died
or resigned during their terms in Hawaii Oklahoma, and South Carolina. The calculation in this and the next
footnote is based on the author’s review of the data on the “geography” button of each 2014 Senate Race page on
the Center for Responsive Politics website.
28
Senators Cotton (R-Ark), Franken (D-MN), McConnell (R- Ky), Risch (R-Ida), Shaheen (D-NH), and Sullivan (R-Ak).
29
Lalita Clozel, Super PAC(ked) With Out-of-State Money, OpenSecrets.org, Oct 3, 2014,
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/10/super-packed-with-out-of-state-money/
30
Id; see also “American Heartland PAC,”
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cmte=C00548867&cycle=2014.
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U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, Congress “is not a confederation of nations in which separate
sovereigns are represented by appointed delegates, but is instead a body composed of
representatives of the people”31 – one people. Indeed, Edmund Burke made a similar point –
about Parliament, of course – in the very letter Chief Justice Roberts quoted in McCutcheon
when Burke declared that “Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and
hostile interests . . . but . . . a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the
whole.”32 All members of Congress in some sense represent all Americans so that nonconstituents join constituents in having a stake in the outcome of a district election. Particularly
when, as in 2014, the partisan control of a legislative chamber is up for grabs, residents of New
York, California, and Texas have as direct and objective a concern in the outcome of closely
contested Senate races in Alaska, Arkansas, and Iowa as the residents of those states. There may
be a tension between representing the interests of constituents and non-constituents but that is
built into the structure of Congress.
The growing role of out-of-state and out-of-district contributions in state and local
elections may present a different issue.33 Although I have not seen any comprehensive studies,
media surveys and scholarly accounts of particular elections over the last several years chronicle
the large and growing role of non-constituent money in state governorship,34 state gubernatorial

31

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 821 (1995).
Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol.
33
See, e.g., Mary Jo Pizzi & Rob O’Dell, “Outside money played huge role in Arizona elections,” The Arizona
Republic, Nov. 8, 2014, http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/arizona/politics/2014/11/09/election-outsidemoney-campaign-funding/18751133/; Chris Kardish, “Outsiders Add Money and Negativity to State and Local
Elections,” Governing, Oct. 2014, http://www.governing.com/topics/elections/gov-outside-spending-state-localelections.html.
34
See, e.g., Steve Contorno, “Terry McAuliffe gets 78% of campaign cash from outside Virginia,” Washington
Examiner, April 23, 2103, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/terry-mcauliffe-gets-78-of-campaign-cash-fromoutside-virginia/article/2527992; Matea Gold & Ben Pershing, “Groups flush with out-of-state cash flock to Va
gov’s race as testing ground, Washington Post, Sept 23, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/groupsflush-with-out-of-state-cash-flock-to-virginia-governors-race-as-testing-ground/2013/09/22/1209aeb8-2221-11e3966c-9c4293c47ebe_story.html; Bill Lueders, “Scott Walker tops Mary Burke in major and out-of-state
donations,” July 24, 2014, http://wisconsinwatch.org/2014/07/scott-walker-tops-mary-burke-in-major-and-out-ofstate-donations/; Mal Leary, “Analysis Indicates Big Increase in Out-of-State Money Pouring into Me Gov’s Race,”
Sept. 24, 2014, http://news.mpbn.net/post/analysis-indicates-big-increase-out-state-money-pouring-mainegovernors-race; Derrick DePledge, “Mainland super PACs help shape gov’s race,” Honolulu Star-Advertiser, Oct. 29,
2014,
http://www.staradvertiser.com/elections/20141028__campaign_spending_Mainland_super_PACs_help_shape_go
vs_race_.html?id=280619322.
32

9

recall,35 state attorney general,36 state secretary of state,37 state judicial38 and judicial retention,39
state ballot proposition,40 state legislative,41 state legislative recall,42 and even mayor and council
elections in cities big -- like Boston43 and Chicago44 -- and small, Coralville, Iowa.45 This out-of-

35

See One Wisconsin Now, “Walker’s Unprecedented Out-of-state Contributions Alarming,” Dec. 16, 2101,
http://www.onewisconsinnow.org/press/walkers-unprecedented-out-of-state-contributions-alarming.html; Tom
Kertscher, “Behind the Rhetoric: The in-state, out-of-state campaign money debate,” May 22, 2012,
http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/article/2012/may/22/behind-rhetoric-state-out-state-money-debate/
36
See, e.g., Caroline Bleakley, “Race for attorney general’s seat turns dirty,” Nov. 3, 2104,
http://www.8newsnow.com/story/27053464/race-for-attorney-generals-seat-turns-dirty; Ben Wieder, “Big Money
Comes to State AG Races,” The Atlantic, May 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/uschamber-targets-dems-in-state-attorney-general-races/361874/; Luke Broadwater, “Out-of-state groups pump
money into attorney general’s race,” Baltimore Sun, June 20,. 2014, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-0620/news/bs-md-attorney-general-funds-20140620_1_jon-cardin-attorney-general-frosh; Paul Hammel, “Outside
money in GOP attorney general race raises concerns,” Omaha World-herald, May 9, 2014,
http://www.omaha.com/news/outside-money-in-gop-attorney-general-race-raises-concerns/article_7487c8078fef-53d2-b93e-823dc82f9c47.html.
37
See, e.g., Phil Keisling & Sam Reed, “The Troubling Partisanization of Elections for Secretary of State,” Governing,
Dec. 10, 2014, http://www.governing.com/columns/smart-mgmt/col-troubling-partisanization-elections-secretarystate.html; Capitol Insider: CGOP Attacks Dem over out-of-state money,” Columbus Dispatch, Aug. 31, 2014 (Ohio
Secretary of State election), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/08/31/gop-attacks-dem-overout-of-state-money.html.
38
See, e.g., Center for Public Integrity, “D.C.-based groups bombarded state high court races with ads,” June 14,
2102, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/06/13/12793/dc-based-groups-bombarded-state-high-court-racesads; Erick Eckholm, “Outside Spending Enters Arena of Judicial Races,” N.Y. Times, May 5, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/us/politics/outside-spending-transforms-supreme-court-election-in-northcarolina.html?_r=0; Joe Palazzolo, “Judges Step Up Electioneering as Outside Money Pours Into Races,” Wall St. J.,
Oct. 13, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/judges-step-up-electioneering-as-outside-money-pours-into-races1413149643; “Van Dyke too influenced by out-of-state money,” Helena Independent Record, Oct. 15, 2104
(Montana supreme court election), http://helenair.com/news/opinion/vandyke-too-influenced-by-out-of-statemoney/article_5e981fea-5b76-5d5b-a54b-78ac6609074c.html.
39
See, e.g., Linda Casey, “Independent Expenditure Campaigns in Iowa Topple Three High Court Justices,” National
Inst. on Money in State Politics, Jan 10, 2011, http://classic.followthemoney.org//press/ReportView.phtml?r=440.
40
See. e.g., Patrick M. Garry, Derek A. Nelsen & Candice J. Spurlin, “Raising the Question of Whether Out-of-state
Political Contributions May Affect a Small State’s Political Autonomy: A Case Study of the South Dakota Voter
Referendum on Abortion, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 35 (2010); Monica Youn, Proposition 8 and the Mormon Church: A Case
Study in Donor Disclosure, 81 G.W.L.Rev. 2108 (2013); “Dupont Pioneer Shatters Record for Largest Oregon
Political Donation,” Willamette Week, Oct. 24, 2014 ($4.46 million given by Iowa-based business to affect Oregon
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state participation in state and local elections is increasingly systematic, with national party
groups -- like the Republican and Democratic Governors’ Associations, 46 the Republican State
Leadership Committee, and the Democratic Legislative Campaign Committee47 – and major
Super PACs playing leading roles in state elections. These organizations pull money from state
parties, wealthy individuals, businesses, trade associations, unions and other organizations in
“donor” states and redistribute the funds to state parties, Super PACs48 or candidates in
competitive elections in recipient states where the money may be more useful in advancing the
group’s partisan or ideological objectives, or where the legal restrictions of the donor state on the
size of donations or the use of money from certain sources in state elections do not apply.49 Some
of this outside money is contributed to candidate and some is used for independent spending.
Through both routes, outside groups and wealthy outside individuals have become major players
in statewide elections, legislative district races, and ballot proposition contests.
Non-constituent contributions are, thus, an increasingly significant fact of life in
American elections, of widespread importance not just in those elections where the outsiderdonor is directly governed by the outcome, but in races where the outsider is truly an outsider,
not part of the political community that is choosing its elected leadership. The growth of nonconstituent contributions reflects and reinforces the growing nationalization and, for want of a
better term, the partisanization of our elections50 at federal, state, and local levels, and in
executive, legislative, judicial, and ballot proposition contests. Some scholarly observers have
praised this development. My Columbia colleague Jessica Bulman-Pozen contends that such
non-constituent engagement in another state’s elections strengthens federalism by enhancing the
44
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role of the states as “sites for political identification,” enabling them to better “serve as
counterweights to the federal government” and as sites for political identification.” 51 She also
suggests that non-constituent participation in state elections allows individuals who feel
“alienated from their own state governments to affiliate with another state government.” 52 In
more traditional First Amendment language Professor E. Todd Pettys defends what he nicely
refers to as “long-armed” donations as a form of political association between candidates and
outsiders.53
Certainly outsiders have an interest – whether subjective or objective – in state, local, and
Congressional districts. And yet there are nagging doubts about the outsider campaign financing
role. Virtually all the newspaper articles on out-of-state or out-of-district donations I have cited
view the growing impact of non-constituent contributors with alarm, voicing the concern that
outsiders are taking over the state’s or locality’s political process. Candidates typically try to
make their rivals’ dependence on campaign money a campaign issue, although the role of outside
money in financing both competitors makes it difficult for voters to act on that concern. The title
of the in-depth study of the role of outside money in South Dakota’s abortion referendum asked
the “Question of Whether Out-of-State Political Contributions May Affect a Small State’s
Political Autonomy.”54 Professor Anthony Johnstone’s recent article on “Outside Influence”
begins with the accusatory “By what rights do outsiders influence state or local politics?”55 And
retired Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, in his fall 2014 Harold Leventhal Lecture
treated the McCutcheon Court’s “failure to discuss” the distinction between donations by instaters versus non-constituents ineligible to vote in the election affected by the contribution as
such an egregious oversight that the McCutcheon decision ought to be dismissed with no more
than a derisive “Oops!”56
The implication of outside money for self-government is, thus, a contested one, not
resolved by the fact of outsider interest in the outcome of a state, local or district election. In
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sense, outside donors have become a new constituency albeit one quite different from the usual
meaning of the term.
II. The Non-Constituent Contributor Constituency
“Constituent” has a well-established meaning as one of a group of citizens who elect a
representative to a legislature or other public body.57 “Constituent” is derived from the Latin root
stare – “to stand” – so that a constituent someone who “appoints another as agent” presumably to
stand for the constituent.”58 According to the dictionary, a constituent is “a person who
authorizes another to act in his or her behalf, as a voter in a district represented by an elected
official.”59 Moreover, the role of the constituency is not simply to define the units for the election
of representatives but to determine to whom the representative is to be accountable.
“Representatives should presumably be accountable to those who authorized them to act.”60 In
the American context – indeed, in most Western democracies – constituencies are typically
defined geographically with the constituents the individuals who are residents of the territory of
the constituency.61 Shaun McCutcheon of Alabama was surely not “one of the people who live
and vote” in the many constituencies in other states that voted on the candidates to whom he
gave and wanted to give money.
Of course, electoral constituents are not the only people who in some sense may be
represented by an officeholder. In a legislative body, a representative from one district may also
represent the interests of individuals or groups from other districts. This may be a matter of
demographics: an African-American or female representative may be more representative of the
interests of African-Americans or women in districts whose elected representatives are white or
male than the representatives actually elected from that district. Similarly, party may be a basis
for non-constituent representation, with elected Democrats representing the interests of
57
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Democrats living in Republican-controlled districts and elected Republicans similarly
representing the interests of Republicans resident in Democratic ideas. So, too, non-constituent
representation may grow out of ideology, as elected environmentalists, Tea Party members, prolife or pro-choice advocates, or hawks or doves may speak on behalf of people with similar
views throughout the nation, not just their state or district voting constituencies. As political
scientist Jane Mansbridge, who dubbed this phenomenon “surrogate representation,” has
explained, such representation “plays the normatively critical role of providing representation to
voters who lose in their own districts” and thus adds democratic legitimacy to the electoral
system.62 Such surrogate representation can offset the lack of proportional representation for
certain groups and add perspectives to legislative deliberation.63
Jessica Bulman-Pozen has taken Mansbridge’s argument one step further, applying it not
just to out-of-district representation within a legislature but to the cross-border interest of
residents of one state in the political processes of other states. She argues that the decisions of
what I will call the target state can have an impact on the politics of the non-constituent’s home
state by “creat[ing] momentum for a particular policy or political party, [or] . . . build[ing] a reallie example to inform national debate.”64 In her view, cross-border political engagement also has
psychological benefits to out-of-staters who can “take comfort in knowing that their preferences
are actual policy – and their partisan group in control – somewhere.”65 Bulman-Pozen’s
normative point is that cross-border political activity confirms the role of states as “platforms for
national political struggle”66 and, thus, strengthens their significance within the federal system.
To that extent, she believes it is good for federalism. But she has less to say about the impact of
cross-border political activity – particularly the effect of outside campaign contributions – on the
extent to which state elected officials represent their actual residents and voting constituents. The
evidence on that question is more troubling.
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To begin with, only a small fraction of Americans – perhaps 4% in the hotly contested
2008 elections – make any campaign contributions at all.67 And a tiny fraction of that already
very small group actually provides most of the money. In the 2013-14 federal elections, fewer
than 700,000 people – less than ¼ of 1% of the total population and less than 1/3 of 1% of the
adult population donated the itemized $200+ contributions which together account for 66.7% of
all individual contributions to federal candidates parties and PACs.68 And just 18% of that
already very small group – the donors who gave $2600+ -- accounted for 73% of the itemized
donations and 49% of total donations. 69 At the very top, in 2012 (before McCutcheon lifted the
federal aggregate contribution limit) a mere 1/100th of 1% of the population (a little over 31,000
people) contributed 28% of all itemized federal contributions.70 The minimum amount
contributed that qualified a donor for membership in the elite 1% of the 1% of donors was
$12,950, and the median within the group was $26,584.71 Of course, the contributions of some
donors in this group were in the millions of dollars. As a result, candidates, political parties, and
the political committees which give to candidates and parties or spend independently to support
them are heavily dependent or a relatively small number of very big givers.
These campaign financiers “come from a narrow stratum of American society” 72 that is
demographically different from the rest of the population. They are, on average, older, better
educated, more likely to be white, more likely to be male, more affluent,73 more likely to be in
business or the professions, and more partisan or ideologically extreme than the average voter,
with the differences between donors and voters widening for the larger donors.74 The very largest
donors tend to be business owners, chief executive officers, Fortune 500 or Forbes 400 board
67
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members whose fortunes are based in finance, lobbying, or technology.75 They work at Goldman
Sachs, Blackstone, Kirkland & Ellis, Morgan Stanley, Comcast, Google, and similar firms. 76 The
leading donors who provide a disproportionate share of campaign funds are also typically
“habitual” donors who give year in and year out and support multiple candidates in each election
cycle.77 These donors are more likely to be asked for donations; to solicit further donations from
their business or social networks, to bundle the donations of others,78 and to serve on or head
candidates finance committees.79 They donors give to influence elections, affect public policy,
and obtain material benefits for themselves or their businesses.80
Large and repeat donors have distinctive political views across the span of economic and
social issues,81 and, not surprisingly, their views appear to be well-represented in the actions of
their officials they have helped to elect. They are more likely to want to balance the budget
through spending cuts than tax increases, to worry more about inflation than unemployment, and
to favor cutting social welfare programs than do other Americans.82A number recent studies have
shown that donors appear to have succeeded in their goals, with the views and voting records of
members of Congress far often more in sync with the views of their affluent donors than their
voters.83 A survey of several thousand state legislators recently found that the legislators were
quite willing to acknowledge that the passage of bills in their chamber was influenced by the
financial contributions of individuals and groups to candidates and parties.84 More generally,
75
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there is considerable evidence that a wide range of public policies are more reflective of the
views of the affluent than of middle-income or law-income Americans, with campaign
contributions playing at least some role in influencing this class-based differential
representation.85
In effect, donors have become a distinctive constituency of their own, influencing both
candidate success and government decision-making. They serve as “gatekeepers” of the electoral
process,86 helping to determine which candidates are able to effectively compete for election,
constraining the policy space in which elected officials operate and shaping the agenda for
government action.87 For some elected officials, “knowing the interests of their financial
constituents is just as important as knowing the opinions of their voting constituents.”88 These
financial constituents are likely to have different concerns than non-donor voters and prefer
different policy alternatives than non-donor constituents.89 As Senator Chris Murphy (D.-Conn)
nicely put it, “I talked a lot more about carried interest” (that is, the tax treatment of the profits
that private equity and hedge fund managers earn on investments) in calls to donors “than I did
in the supermarket.”90 Moreover, financial constituents are both more likely to seek direct access
to elected officials (including legislators from districts other than their own) 91 to present their
views and to get that access when they want it.92
This effect of large campaign contributions on the representation of non-donor voters is
compounded by non-constituent contributors. Non-constituent donors, particularly those who
contribute in multiple campaigns, are even more affluent, better educated, more partisan, and
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more ideological than donors generally.93 They tend to live with people like themselves in
distinctive high-wealth neighborhoods within cosmopolitan areas, and to have little or no
connection to or interest in the people of the states or districts to which they send their campaign
dollars other than seeking to influence the outcome of that election. 94 The communities whose
residents have the greatest propensity to give are high wealth and politically connected enclaves,
including the most affluent suburbs in major metropolitan areas. In 2012, the places with the
highest rate of donations included Chevy Chase, Maryland, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, Palm
Beach, Florida, and Greenwich, Connecticut.95 So, too, in absolute dollars, most federal
campaign contributions come from relatively few places. In the 2005-06 election cycle, 77% of
all itemized individual federal campaign contributions came from 5% of all zip codes. 96 Another
study focused on a slightly earlier period found that twenty percent of Congressional districts
provided a majority of the itemized individual campaign funds.97

In the 2013-14 federal

elections, itemized individual donations were disproportionately from the Washington, D.C.,
New York, and San Francisco metropolitan areas – in other words, from lobbyists, Wall Street,
and Silicon Valley.98 Indeed, ten zip codes (all in New York, Washington, San Francisco and
Chicago) generated more than $233 million in itemized campaign contributions, or roughly the
same amount as the total amount provided by the bottom 25 states.99 Washington, D.C. – which
elects no senators and has a single non-voting representative in the House of Representatives -provided as much money in itemized individual elections in the last federal election cycle as the
residents of 29 states.100 It appears that the slogan embraced by the District of Columbia’s
distinctive “Taxation without Representation” license plate101 is mistaken, as the District is
exceedingly well-represented through its campaign donations in federal elections. The role of the
Washington area, in particular, is likely to grow in the post-McCutcheon era as “K Street’s
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familiar refrain to candidates’ please for campaign cash – ‘I’ve maxed out’ – is no longer
operative.”102 It is perhaps ironic that if cross-border donations are strengthening the political
role of the states so much money is coming from a place that is not a state at all.
In the system of representative government, voting constituencies use elections to select
the representatives who will act for them, to empower those representatives, and through the
grant or denial of reelection to make those representatives accountable for their actions and
responsive to constituent concerns. The design of constituencies both expresses the political
values of a society103 and shapes the kinds of policies and programs representatives will
pursue.104 Our campaign finance system gives our elected representatives a second constituency
– a contributor constituency frequently composed of non-members of the voting constituency.
The contributor constituency often has no right to vote for the representatives but by contributing
or threatening to withhold money (or threatening to give to an opponent) it can help determine
which candidates will be able to campaign effectively to the voting constituency and who can
seek re-election. They may no determine who wins elections but they are often crucial to making
election possible. Elected officials, in turn, are influenced to act in ways that maintain the flow of
campaign dollars. In so doing, they represent constituencies that did not elect them, as well as
those that do. Not only does the contributor constituency have a very different relationship to the
elected representatives than the voting constituency, but contributor constituents often have
different political concerns and goals that have may have little relationship to, and may in fact be
at odds with, the concerns and goals of the residents of the voting constituency. The campaign
finance system may promote accountability to constituents, but it is accountability to the
contributor constituency, not the voting constituency which nominally empowers the
representatives to act and legitimates their authority.
III. Non-Constituent Contributions and Campaign Finance Law
In his Harold Leventhal Lecture, Justice Stevens pointed out that the Supreme Court has
never explicitly addressed the question of whether a citizen of one state has a constitutionally
protected interest in giving money to a candidate running for office in another state. He argues
102
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that the right to contribute can, like the right to vote itself, be limited to residents of the
jurisdiction holding the election.105 Although the Supreme Court itself has never directly
considered the question, 106 the issue has come up in a handful of state and lower federal court
cases and has generally, albeit not consistently, been resolved in favor of the non-constituent
contributor. It is more than likely that’s how the current Supreme Court would resolve the issue
today. States and localities may – and do – adopt measures to stimulate constituent contributions,
but there is probably nothing they can do to stem the flow of non-constituent donations.
The case for limiting non-constituent contributions builds on the Supreme Court’s
statement in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa107 that “our cases have uniformly recognized
that a government unit may legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political processes
to those who reside within its borders.”108Although Holt Civic Club dealt only with the right to
vote in local elections, it may be said to stand for a broader principle of democratic selfgovernment in which the representative institutions of a political community like a city or state
are controlled by the members of that community, which is to say, its residents. The residency
principle is incorporated in the many state laws that require a candidate to be a resident of the
jurisdiction he or she seeks to represent,109 the laws that count only state residents in determining
whether a petition has enough signatures to qualify a candidate or proposition for a place on the
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ballot,110 and, more contestedly, in laws that require that petition circulators also be state
residents.111
Campaign finance doctrine, by contrast, has been framed in terms of the First
Amendment freedoms of speech and association. It involves campaigning, not casting ballots or
placing candidates or issues on ballots. The Supreme Court has protected the rights of minors too
young to vote to vote to make contributions to candidates and political parties,112 as well as the
rights of corporations ineligible to vote to make campaign expenditures. 113 The only interests the
Supreme Court has recognized as justifying restrictions on contributions are the prevention of
corruption and the appearance of corruption,114 and the prevention of the circumvention of valid
anti-corruption restrictions.115 As McCutcheon indicates, anti-corruption does not easily justify
restrictions on dollar-limited non-constituent donations.
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Challengers to laws permitting non-constituent donations and defenders of laws limiting
them have sought to break this distinction between campaigning and voting by claiming that the
right to give money can be tied to the right to vote. They have sought to invoke the concept of
the “republican form of government,” with the assertion that outside money threatens the voter
control of government at the heart of self-government. Although the argument has had some
traction in court, it has generally failed.
On two occasions, third-party candidates for Congress and their supporters, challenged
FECA’s “authorization” of – in reality, its failure to limit or bar -- out-of-state or out-of-district
contributions in Congressional campaigns. In the first case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in 1995 summarily rejected the claim. The court found that the plaintiffs
lacked standing because invalidation of FECA’s contribution provisions would not provide them
the remedy of curtailing outsider contributions, and it dismissed plaintiffs’ request to bar
competing candidates from accepting out-of-state donations as “frivolous.”116 The court noted
plaintiffs’ contention, growing out of the republican form of government guarantee, that “the
Constitution entitles them to representation by someone not beholden to any citizen of another
state” and acknowledged “it can be argued that pure localism affords better representation.” But
the court also made the opposite point that “one could argue to the contrary that a Representative
acts on matters affecting the interests of all Americans, so all Americans should have the right to
express themselves on who ought to be a Representative.” Without actually determining which
is the better argument, the court observed that limits on out-of-state donations “may violate the
rights out-of-state contributors,” noted that “[n]o statute or precedent supports plaintiffs’ claims,”
and concluded that as the Guarantee Clause is not judicially enforceable, the claims must be
dismissed. 117
The federal district court for the District of Columbia reached the same result in a very
similar case nine years later. Again, the court found plaintiffs lacked standing as invalidating
FECA’s contribution provisions would not redress their “grievance” resulting from the flow of
out-of-state money to their major party opponents.118 This court was also somewhat clearer in
suggesting that non-constituents have a right to contribute in federal elections, observing that
116
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barring out-of-state money from a United States Senate race would be an “unprecedented
limitation on constitutional freedom.”119
These challenges to FECA sought only to compel courts to impose restrictions on out-ofstate or out-of-district contributions but did not consider the constitutionality of laws actually
targeting non-constituent campaign donations. That issue has come up in three states that
restricted outsider money, with the courts that considered the issue divided concerning both the
analysis and the results.
In 1994, Oregon voters passed Ballot Measure 6, which amended the state constitution to
bar state candidates from “us[ing] or direct[ing] any contributions other than those given by
“individuals who at the time of their donation were residents of the electoral district of the public
office sought by the candidate.”120 A second section of the amendment implicitly permitted state
candidates to take up to ten percent of their funds from non-constituent donors but then provided
that any candidate who is more than ten percent non-constituent-funded would forfeit his or her
office if the candidate won the election and barred both elected and defeated candidates from
holding an elected public office for twice the period of the office sought.121 In Vannatta v.
Keisling, the Oregon federal district court held Measure 6 unconstitutional. Following Buckley v.
Valeo, the court found that contributions are political speech protected by the First Amendment
and that the restriction burdened the speech and associational rights of out-of-district donors by
limiting the amount of their donations that may be used by candidates. 122 Although the court
struck down the entire measure, its analysis focused exclusively on the effect of the law on outof-district rather than out-of-state donors. The court emphasized that “[e]lected officials in state
offices impact all state residents, not just the candidate’s constituents within his election district.
Therefore, the Measure impacts out-of-district residents from associating with a candidate for
state office who, if elected, will have a real and direct impact on those persons.”123 Turning to the
public interests Buckley determined would justify contribution restrictions – the prevention of
corruption and its appearance – the court held that the Measure was not properly tailored to
address these anti-corruption concerns as it would permit both large out-of-district donations if
119
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they did not exceed ten percent of a candidate’s total expenditures and large in-district
contributions.124
A divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed.125 All three judges agreed that contributions to
political campaigns are protected by the First Amendment, that the Measure burdened the right
to contribute, and that the standard of review of contribution restrictions is “rigorous” but not
strict scrutiny.126 The panel unanimously concluded that the restriction on out-of-district
contributions could not be justified by Buckley’s anti-corruption concerns because the
amendment applied to all such contributions “regardless of size or any other factor that would
tend to indicate corruption” and there was no “evidence which demonstrates that all out-ofdistrict contributions lead to the sort of corruption discussed in Buckley.” 127 The panel, however,
divided over the question whether the restrictions could be justified by the state’s interest in
preserving its republican form of government. Citing to Supreme Court cases dealing with the
right to vote and upholding laws limiting access to a state’s public schools to the state’s
residents, Judge Brunetti’s dissent emphasized the state’s “strong interest in ensuring that elected
officials represent those who elect them” and in “ensuring that only those who are constituents
participate in the electoral process.”128 Measure 6’s differentiation between constituents and nonconstituents for purposes of making campaign contributions was comparable to “residency
requirements for voting.”129 Invoking Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce130 -- at that
time still good law – he situated the restriction on non-constituent donations within Austin’s
determination that a state could limit the role of corporate treasury funds in elections to be sure
that “expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by
corporations.”131 In his view, the relevant “’actual public support’ in the context of protecting
elections from unfair influences . . . is by definition limited to those who are eligible to vote, i.e.
district residents.”132 He found Measure 6 to be a “manifestation of the state of Oregon’s
judgment that out-of-district donations have the potential for undue influence” – a judgment
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which, under Austin, he concluded deserved “considerable deference.”133 Noting that Measure 6
did not restrict independent expenditures by outsiders, Judge Brunetti concluded that the burden
on First Amendment rights was modest and justified by the state’s interest in “ensur[ing] the
integrity of political structures and processes.”134 The majority, however, voted to invalidate the
Measure. The majority dismissed the relevance of the right to vote case law to “the right to First
Amendment speech” and, in a sentence, summarily concluded that Measure 6 ‘is not saved by
the argument that it protects the republican form of government.”135
The following year a unanimous Alaska Supreme Court in State v. Alaska Civil Liberties
Union136 upheld against a First Amendment challenge an Alaska law limiting the aggregate
amounts of contributions that state candidates, political parties, or political committees can
receive from non-Alaska residents. Candidates for governor and lieutenant governor could
receive no more than $20,000 in the aggregate for all nonresident individuals; a candidate for
the state senate could accept no more than a total of $5000 from out-of-staters; candidates for
state representative or municipal office could take only $3000 from non-Alaskans; and
contributions from out-of-state individuals could amount to no more than 10% of the total
contributions each year by state political parties and other political groups.137 As the Alaska
court noted, the Alaska measure was less restrictive than Oregon’s in that it limited only out-ofstate donations and did not attempt to restrict inter-district contributions within the state, so that
all Alaskans could contribute to candidates for state office.138 Without expressly invoking the
republican form of government, the court implicitly relied on it in finding, as Judge Brunetti had,
that the state had an interest -- akin to the anti-distortion one recognized by the Supreme Court in
Austin -- in controlling the “corrupting influence” of “cumulatively vast out-of-state
contributions . . . from drowning out the voices of Alaska residents.”139 Recognizing that the
caps would preclude even small donations once the statutory ceilings were reached, the Court
emphasized that “nonresident contributions may be individually modest, but can cumulatively
133
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overwhelm Alaskans’ political contributions. Without restraints, Alaska’s elected officials can be
subjected to purchased or coerced influence which is grossly disproportionate to the support
nonresidents’ views have among the Alaska electorate, Alaska contributors, and those most
intimately affected by elections, Alaska residents.”140 Blending anti-corruption and republican
self-government concerns together, the court concluded that although “[o]utside influence plays
a legitimate part in Alaska politics” nonresident contributions may be limited “to prevent elected
officials from becoming beholden to those influences.”141
Three years later, however, the federal district court for Vermont in Landell v. Sorrell
reached a very different result. Landell invalidated Vermont’s law imposing a 25% cap on the
percentage of funds state candidates, political parties, and PACs could accept from out-ofstaters.142 Applying the rigorous scrutiny normally applicable to contribution limits, the court
found that the law burdened First Amendment rights because it would bar some potential donors
from contributing to state candidates, and that it was not justified by anti-corruption concerns.
“[M]ost if not all of the examples of allegedly suspicious out of state contributions” presented by
the state to justify the law “also happened to be large and were from special interest that are
viewed by the public stereotypically as the source of suspicious campaign money. There was no
evidence that the fact that the money came from out of state is necessarily the root of the
problem.”143 The court also implicitly rejected the republican self-government concern when it
found that “many people outside of Vermont have legitimate stakes in Vermont politics, and
therefore have a right to participate in Vermont elections. Individuals from outside Vermont who
are nevertheless influenced by Vermont law must have some access to the political process
here.”144
A Second Circuit panel unanimously affirmed.145 Like the district court, the appellate
judges framed the question entirely in First Amendment terms, limited the justifications for
restricting campaign contributions to the prevention of corruption, and found no evidence that
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out-of-state donors raise a particular danger of corruption. 146 Indeed, in the court’s view, the
state’s drawing of an in-state/out-of-state distinction smacked of viewpoint discrimination: “the
government does not have a permissible interest in disproportionately curtailing the voices of
some, while giving others free rein, because it questions the value of what they have to say.” 147
The Alaska Supreme Court’s recognition of a state’s interest in shaping its electoral system to be
more accountable to state residents was summarily dismissed by the Second Circuit, which
concluded “we are unpersuaded that the First Amendment permits state governments to preserve
their systems from the influence, exercised only through speech-related activities, of nonresidents.”148
With the results in the cases directly considering challenges to non-constituent
contributions somewhat mixed, it may be that the most significant case is one that did not
actually address the issue but still articulated powerful arguments for both sides of the question.
In Bluman v. FEC,149 a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia upheld the provision of federal campaign finance law150 banning foreigners, other than
lawful permanent residents, from donating money to candidates in federal or state elections,
contributing to the national political parties and other political committees, and making express
advocacy expenditures for or against candidates in United States. In an opinion by Judge
Kavanaugh, the court determined that the United States “has a compelling interest for purposes
of the First Amendment in limiting the participation of foreign citizens in activities of American
democratic self-government.”151 More to the point, campaign contributions and expenditures
“constitute part of the process of democratic self-government” because they “are an integral
aspect of the process by which Americans elect officials to federal, state, and local government
offices.” The campaign activities financed by contributions and expenditures – including
advertisements, speeches, rallies, and get-out-the-vote drives -- “are part of the overall process of
democratic self-government.”152 Indeed, “[s]pending money to contribute to a candidate or party
146
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or to expressly advocate for or against the election of a political candidate is participating in the
process of democratic self-government.”153 Not only can the government bar foreigners from
voting and holding elected office but “[i]t follows” that the government may also bar foreign
citizens who are not lawful permanent residents “from participating in the campaign process that
seeks to influence how voters will cast their ballots in the election.154
If the court had stopped there then Bluman would provide powerful rhetorical and logical
support for laws constraining non-constituent donations generally. The same nexus linking
membership in the political community to participation in the processes of democratic selfgovernment and the finding that the giving and spending of campaign money is as “integral” a
part of those processes as voting and running for office ought to apply to states, local
governments, and possibly electoral constituencies within legislative bodies, too. However, the
opinion did not stop there. Rather Judge Kavanaugh went on to indicate that the relevant
distinction is not between specific political community members – such as constituents of a state,
city, or legislative district – and nonconstituents but between members in the American political
community more broadly and non-Americans. “[C]itizens of other states and municipalities are
all members of the American political community.”155 As a result “[t]he compelling interest that
justifies Congress in restraining foreign nationals’ participating in American elections – namely,
preventing foreign influence over the U.S, government – does not apply equally to . . . citizens of
other states and municipalities.”156
In other words, although the music of Bluman – its treatment of campaign finance as an
integral part of democratic self-government, its association of campaign money with voting and
candidacy, and its assumption that participation in self-government can be linked to political
community members – makes the case for restricting non-constituent contributions, the specific
words -- which insist that at least for campaign finance there is only one relevant political
community, “the American political community” – constitute a powerful rejection of the
argument. Although technically dicta, the decision ultimately undermines the argument based on
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the association of campaign contributions with eligibility to vote or hold office for members of
the American political community.
It is extremely likely that laws restricting non-constituent contributions – whether by
barring them outright or limiting the amount or percentage of total donations a candidate or
political committee may accept from non-constituents – would be held unconstitutional.
Contribution restrictions burden the speech and associational rights of would-be donors, are
subject to exacting judicial review, and must be closely tailored to advancing the public interests
in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, with the current Court emphasizing
that corruption means “quid pro quo” corruption and does not a broader concern about the
influence on or access to government that big spenders and donors may obtain.157 As both the
Ninth and Second Circuits have noted, there is no reason to believe that a donation from a nonconstituent presents a greater danger of corruption than a donation of comparable size from a
constituent. Citizen United’s rejection of Austin’s theory of anti-distortion corruption158 fatally
undercuts the position of the Ninth Circuit dissent and the Alaska Supreme Court that a state can
protect its elections from campaign money that is not reflective of the views of voters within a
state or district. The democratic self-government argument which supports the authority of a
political community to limit voting, candidacy, and the signing of ballot petitions to constituency
members is unlikely to provide support for the community to limit campaign finance
participation to community members. Indeed, with the rights of non-voting minors to make
contributions and of corporation and unions to make independent expenditures previously
established, campaign finance has already been separated from voting. Campaign finance
involves efforts to influence voters, or to provide candidates, parties, and political committees
with the resources to do so. Although, as Bluman acknowledges, influencing and funding the
influencing of voter decisions are intimately connected with the electoral process, they do not
actually entail the formal acts of voting or placing candidates and propositions on the ballot. The
latter may be reserved for community residents, but as a matter of First Amendment
jurisprudence, the former are rights broadly available to members of the American political
community as a whole.
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To be sure, Alaska’s restrictions on out-of-state donations remain on the books, and at
least one other state – Hawaii -- also places an aggregate cap on the percentage of total
contributions a state candidate may receive from non-residents.159 It is revealing that all the
states that have sought to control the electoral impact of out-of-state money – Alaska, Hawaii,
Oregon, Vermont -- have relatively small populations and, thus, perhaps well-founded fears of
the potential power of out-of-state money. But at this point the Alaska and Hawaii laws appear to
be legal outliers, ripe for constitutional challenge, rather than precedents for or harbingers of
efforts to control outside influence.
In one aspect of campaign finance law, a preference for in-state or in-district donors over
outsiders is well-established: public funding. States and localities that provide candidates with
public funds typically condition the eligibility for funding on the candidate’s collecting a certain
number or dollar value of small qualifying contributions. Most go further160 and require that the
qualifying contributions be provided entirely or primarily by “qualified electors,”161 “registered
voters,”162 “individuals eligible to vote,”163 or residents of the state or constituency.164 Public
159
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funding programs that provide eligible candidates with matching grants based on the number and
value of small private contributions the candidate obtains – as distinguished from public funding
programs that provide a qualifying candidate with a substantial flat grant upon qualification for
funding – may also limit the public fund match to donations from the same category of
constituents, such as residents, whose donations were also necessary to qualify the candidate for
public funding. 165
Can a state or city favor its own voters or residents by limiting a candidate’s eligibility
for public funds to donations from voters or residents and then providing matching funds only to
such constituent contributions? Almost certainly, the answer is yes. In Buckley v. Valeo, the
Supreme Court upheld the federal program of providing public funds to presidential candidates,
finding that the public financing of candidates advances three important goals: reducing “the
deleterious influence of large contributions on our political process,” “facilitat[ing]
communication by candidates with the electorate,” and “free[ing] candidates from the rigors of
fundraising.”166 The Court linked public funding to democratic self-government, determining
Congress “use[d] public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the
electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people.”167 The Court also upheld the provisions
of the presidential primary public funding program tying eligibility for public funds to raising a
threshold amount of private money in smaller donations and then providing public funds on a
matching funds basis.168 As the Court noted, “Congress’ interest in not funding hopeless
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candidacies with large sums of public money . . . necessarily justifies the withholding of public
assistance from candidates without significant public support.”169
Buckley supports the position that a state or city may make eligibility to participate in its
public funding program contingent on a showing “of significant public support” from the state or
local public. That conserves the use of its scarce taxpayer dollars and reserves public funds for
candidates, because they already have a track record of constituent support, are more likely to be
serious contenders. Although campaign contributions have been treated as a form of speech and
association, the contributions that qualify a candidate for public financing and determine how
much public funds a candidate will receive are formal steps to establish eligibility for and the
extent of participation in a state- or city-created, -regulated and –funded program. To that extent,
qualifying and matchable contributions closely resemble the petition signatures required to place
the name of candidate or a proposition on the ballot. Like ballot access petitions, a state or city
“may legitimately require ‘some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support.’”170
Much as a state or city can make placement of a candidate’s name, a political party, or an
initiative or referendum on its ballot contingent on the signatures of an appropriate number state
or local community members,171 it should be able to make eligibility for a grant of state or local
public funds similarly contingent on constituent support.
To be sure, as the Court’s decision in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club
PAC v. Bennett172 demonstrates, the provisions of a public funding program are subject to First
Amendment review. Arizona Free Enterprise determined that providing a publicly-funded
candidate with additional public funds because of the high level of spending of a privatelyfunded opponent or substantial independent spending against the publicly-funded candidate
operates to burden the speech of the privately-funded candidate and independent committee.173
But Arizona Free Enterprise is not relevant to state or local laws conditioning public funding on
constituent donations. Such laws certainly do not burden the spending of privately-funded
169
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candidates or independent groups; if anything, they benefit non-participants in the public funding
program by making it harder for candidates to qualify. They do not burden potential nonconstituent contributors who remain free to contribute to non-participating candidates, political
parties, and independent committees in the state, and even to the publicly-funded candidate to the
extent that the public funding program does not fully fund the publicly-funded candidate’s
campaign. Even if the candidate is fully publicly-funded or is required to accept a spending cap
which limits the candidate’s ability to accept additional donations, the non-constituent donor is
no worse off than in-constituency donors who are also so limited. The only “burden,” if it is one,
on the would-be non-constituent donor is that her donation will not qualify a candidate for public
funds or be matchable and so is to that extent worth less to the candidate. That does not bar the
would-be donor from giving to the candidate and so does not actually limit the donor’s First
Amendment rights of speech or association, although it may make the candidate less eager to
solicit that contribution or associate with the would-be donor.
Arguably a constituent qualifying contribution requirement burdens those candidates who
enjoy greater financial support from outside the jurisdiction relative to those who enjoy broader
in-constituency financial support. Of course, that should operate as an incentive to the candidate
to increase her internal financial support. But in any event that “burden” is no more than the
flipside of the state or local public interest in linking taxpayer campaign subsidies to the fact and
extent of constituent backing. The modest First Amendment burden – if there is a burden at all –
on outside contributors and inside candidates dependent on outside financial support – is justified
by the important government interest in assuring sufficient constituent support as a condition for
access to scarce taxpayer dollars, much as constituent support in the form of petition signatures
may be required as a condition for placing a candidate or voter initiative on the ballot.
***
In short, despite the challenge to the accountability of representatives to their constituents
posed by significant non-constituent campaign financing, there is not much a state, city or
legislative district can do to curb the role of outside campaign money. Outside money almost
surely cannot be barred or subject to aggregate dollar or percentage caps. Outside money is just
as protected by the First Amendment as constituent money, and is unlikely to be seen as posing a
greater threat of quid pro quo corruption as constituent contributions. Even if non-constituent
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contributions distort the priorities or influence the policies that elected representatives pursue or
make them less attentive to the concerns of their constituents, those are not arguments the
Supreme Court will credit as a basis for limiting contributions. Public funding, however, can
provide a means of buffering the impact of non-constituent funding. By providing candidates
with a greater incentive to solicit financial support for constituents and leveraging that support
with additional matching funds, public funding can increase the value of internal financial
support. Public funding has long been supported as a constitutionally acceptable way of limiting
the impacts of private wealth of elections and of campaign contributions on governance
generally. As this discussion suggests, it can be a means of curbing the impact of outside money,
as well.
IV. Campaign Finance and the Concept of Self-Governance
Our decades-long debate about campaign finance regulation has been shaped by what
might be called the democracy-free speech divide. Although since Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme
Court’s campaign finance doctrine has been largely framed by First Amendment concerns, much
of campaign finance regulation has been driven by the belied that campaign finance, like
elections, is part of the project of democratic self-government. Although not precisely a reform
opinion, the framing of campaign finance within election law is nicely captured by Bluman’s
statement that “spending money to influence voters and finance campaigns” “constitute part of
the process of democratic self-government . . . an integral aspect of the process by which
Americans elect officials to federal, state, and local government offices.”174 Campaign finance
reformers have sought to make campaign finance law more like the law of democratic elections
by making it more egalitarian. The expansion of the franchise towards universal adult citizen
suffrage, the invalidation of poll taxes and wealth tests for voting and candidacy, and the
adoption of the one person, one vote rule for legislative apportionment reflect a commitment to
providing all members of the community with an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral
process and, to that extent, a relative equal opportunity to influence government decisionmaking. Analogizing campaign money to voting, reformers would extend the political equality
norm at the heart of our theory of democratic self-government to the financing of campaigns by
curbing the role of unequal private wealth in fueling the campaign finance system. Doctrinally,
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the high water marks of this vision of campaign finance as part of the law of democratic selfgovernment were the Court’s decisions in Austin in 1990 sustaining a state ban on corporate
independent spending because of concern about the impact on elections of “the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate forma and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s
political ideas;”175 and the 2003 decision in McConnell v FEC, sustaining the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002’s ban on soft money contributions because of the preferential
access to members of Congress soft-money donors enjoyed, and the resulting improper influence
on government decision-making.176
However, over the last decade, since Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined the
Court, campaign finance doctrine has moved sharply away from the democratic self-government
framework and has, instead, doubled down on the First Amendment perspective by emphasizing
the speech and associational dimensions of campaign finance. The Court has overruled Austin,
and the anti-distortion doctrine;177 repeatedly rejected equality as a justification for campaign
laws, including not just that limit spending but those that would level up the underfunded; 178 and
repudiated McConnell’s determination that contribution-purchased access to lawmakers and the
resulting influence of government policy-making is a form of corruption.179 Instead, the Court
has likened efforts to limit campaign money to government censorship.180 In the current Court’s
view, contributions and spending, even if unequal, play a value role in enabling candidates,
parties and interested groups to communicate their views to the voters, who are free to decide
how to cast their votes. Contributions are also a means by which donors can associate with
candidates and other donors with similar views and express their support to candidates. Only
campaign contributions that pose of the danger of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance may
be limited. The McCutcheon result, which maintains the quid pro quo-preventing base limits on
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donations to candidates, is easily defended on free speech grounds, as the plurality opinion
demonstrates.181
What is startling about the Chief Justice’s peroration is that it attempts to go beyond the
First Amendment argument that Shaun McCutcheon ought to be free to use his money to express
his views to and associate with as many candidates as he can afford and to make the case for the
right to contribute to an unlimited number of candidates in terms of the responsiveness of
government officials to him. This is an extraordinary move. It is one thing to say, as the Court
has been saying consistently since Citizens United, that government responsiveness to big donors
and independent spenders is not a constitutionally sufficient basis for limiting campaign money.
It is something else again to say that elected officials actually ought to be “cognizant of and
responsive” to their donors. Like campaign finance reformers, the Chief Justice appears to
believe that how we finance our campaigns affects the nature and quality of the representation
that elected officials provide. Unlike reformers, however, the Chief Justice also appears to find
that responsiveness to donors serves, rather than distorts, the democratic representation elections
are supposed to provide.
The Chief Justice appears to assume, despite the facts of the McCutcheon case, that
contributors are congruent with constituents, so that responsiveness to contributors is consistent
with accountability to constituents generally. I believe I have shown that this frequently not the
case. Rather, constituents and contributors are usually very different people with different
interests and concerns who may want different things from government. Indeed, not only does
the Chief Justice’s contention that striking down the aggregation donation limits will promote
accountability to a representative’s constituency fail to persuade, but it actually underscores
exactly what many people find troubling about the current campaign finance system.
The Chief Justice’s rhetoric tries to bridge the divide between the democratic elections
and free speech approaches to campaign finance doctrine by making the case against campaign
finance regulation in terms of not only free speech but government accountability to the public.
But reflection on the constituency-contribution relationship to which his statement calls attention
actually demonstrates just how wide that divide is. Contributors, not constituents, drive the
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campaign finance system. Large donations make representatives less responsive to their actual
constituents and more attentive to their donors, thereby undermining the very responsiveness to
the people which the Chief Justice rightly celebrates as the “key to the concept of selfgovernance.”
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